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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS-REscISSION-RIGHT

OF

INFANT

To

DISAFFIRM

CONTRAcT.-Plaintiff, while a minor, purchased from defendant
securities which subsequently dropped in value until they were practically worthless. On arriving at majority, he notified defendant that
he rescinded transaction, tendered back the certificates and demanded
repayment of purchase price. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff
induced him to part with securities by falsely representing himself to
be of full age. On appeal, held, defense invalid. Plaintiff's fraud
arose out of contract; to uphold the defense would, in reality, be to
deny to plaintiff his right to disaffirm the contract. Sternlieb v.
Nornw-ndie National Securities Corporation,263 N. Y. 245, 188 N.
E. 726 (1934).
Where the action is in contract it is generally held that an infant
may plead infancy despite his misrepresentations as to his age.'
Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions the infant is held liable in tort
for deceit. 2 There, to avoid circuity of action, the adult should be
allowed to plead the damages from the misrepresentation as pro tanto
defense to the infant's action. 3 Some jurisdictions, as in the instant
case, allow rescission on the ground that the tort is so connected with
the contract that to allow the defense would be to emasculate the
rule protecting infants. 4 Other jurisdictions, disregarding the procedural question, have withheld relief on the basis of equitable
estoppel. 5
In the present case, it would seem that the better ruling would
have been to have interposed the defense." If an infant may be held
liable in conversion for the wrongful use of property bailed to him 7
or for obtaining property with an intent not to pay for it,8 then it is
evident that the court, herein, actually allows an infant fraud-doer,
'Myers v. Hurley, 273 U. S. 18, 47 Sup. Ct. 277 (1926), wherein defendant
was allowed to retain part of purchase price although infant had returned the
consideration. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N.
E. 722 (1912) ; see Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553 (1877). Contra: Damron v.
Commonwealth, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1717, 61 S. W. 459 (1901).
2 Epstein v. Frank, 1 Daly 334 (N. Y. 1863); Falk v. MacMasters, 197
App. Div. 357, 188 N. Y. Supp. 795 (2d Dept. 1921) ; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind.
472, 9 N. E. 420 (1886); Smith v. Newark Shoe Co., - Ohio -, 182 N. E.
349 (1932).
' (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 276.
'Instant case; Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513, 56 N. E. 574 (1900).
County Board of Education v. Hinsley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63 (1912);
Looney v. Elkhorn Land Improvement Co., 195 Ky. 198, 242 S. W. 27 (1922);
Pemberton Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Adams, 53 N. J. Eq. 258 (1895) ; La Rosa v.
Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atl. 201 (1918); Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v.
Kreinitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50 (1910).
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921)
§245; CLARKE, CONTRACTS (4th ed.
1931) §§117, 118.
'Collins v. Gifford, 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721 (1911); Campbell v.
Stakes, 2 Wend. 1.37 (N. Y. 1828) ; Lowery v. Cate, 108 Tenn. 54, 64 S. W.
1068 (1901).
' Wallace v. Morss, 5 Hill 391 (N. Y. 1843); Gaunt v. Taylor, 15 N. Y.
Supp. 589 (1891).

RECENT DECISIONS
although conceding that he is generally liable for his torts,9 to protect
himself under the plea of infancy. 10 However, the court recognizes
the undue hardship on defendant but feels itself remediless. It
points out that the relief must come through legislation and that in a
number of states such remedial statutes have already been enacted."
A. A. M.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON NONRESIDENT-RESI-

DOMIcILE CONsTRuED.-Defendant has his home, which
he owns and in which his family dwells, in Virginia. He owns no
property either real or personal in New York. The defendant was
a frequent visitor of this city and while here lived in the same room
in the same hotel, staying at times as long as three weeks. On July
8, 1933, plaintiff issued a summons against the defendant, while
latter party was not in town but who did return for three days in
August, commencing August 21st. On August 30, 1933, an order
was signed for substituted service of summons, which service was
duly made and defendant appears specially to set such service aside.
Held, defendant not a resident within the contemplation of the statute authorizing issuance of an order for substituted service.1
Rawstorne v. Maguire,2 240 App. Div. 1, 269 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st
Dept. 1934).
Substituted service of process has no effect in giving a court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, unless the person is
DENCE AND

domiciled in the state wherein the order was procured. 3
'Supra note 2.

0Ibid.;

1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921)

§245.

" Iowa, Kan., Utah, Wash.
'IN. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1920) §230. This section permits an order
for substituted service to be issued, where defendant is "a natural person
residing within the state" when satisfactory proof is given the plaintiff cannot
be served within the state, due diligence being exercised.
' Martin, J., dissents in opinion; Glennon, J., concurs in dissent.
'De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890). The court
states that a court may acquire jurisdiction by substituted service over both
person and property of a person domiciled within its jurisdiction in the matter
provided for in the lex fori. "But a court has no extra-territorial jurisdiction,
and a person not domiciled in the state or country cannot be charged in
personam by adjudication there, unless he is personally served with notice or
process within it or voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of its court
by appearing in some manner in the action or proceeding sought to be instituted
against him." 120 N. Y. at 495, 24 N. E. at 999. Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun

